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~=======================================

Rights
RICHARD DAGGER

We live, even more thoroughly than did our eighteenth-century
ancestors, in an age of rights. This is evident in domestic affairs,
where women's rights, children's rights, "gay" rights, and animal
rights all have their advocates, as do the rights of the unborn, which
the "right to life" movement defends against those who proclaim
the pregnant woman's "right to choose" to have an abortion. In
international relations, "human rights" has become the watchword
of private groups, governments, and supranational organizations, to
the point where suspect regimes are occasionally warned that they
must improve their "human rights record" if they hope to continue
to receive foreign aid. And at the philosophical level, an imposing
array of treatises- Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously, Gewirth's Reason
and Morality, Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, and Melden's Rights
and Persons among them - testifies to the power of the concept of
rights in moral and political philosophy, at least among theorists in
the Anglo-American tradition.
Nor is this preoccupation with rights confined to the West, as it
was in the eighteenth century. In the Soviet Union, the Preamble to
the 1977 Constitution proclaims "a society of genuine democracy,
whose political system ensures ... the combination of real citizens'
rights and liberties with their duties and responsibilities to society."
Elsewhere, scholars who have claimed to discover the concept of
human rights in traditional Islamic, African, Hindu, and Confucian
thought have gone on to argue for syncretric conceptions of human
rights- conceptions that would temper the "excessive individualism"
of the Western notion by wedding it to the communitarian notions
prevailing in one or another of these traditions. These mixed
I am grateful to Jack Donnelly, who may not agree with everything I say here, for
unusually helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

292

Rights

293

conceptions face problems of their own, like other "mixed
marriages," but they speak clearly nonetheless for the significance
of the concept of rights in political discourse throughout the
world. 1
This, of course, has not always been the case. Indeed, there are
those who believe that the concept of rights was politically
insignificant even in the West until the seventeenth century or, at
the earliest, the late middle ages. Whether this is true will depend, as
we shall see, on what we take the concept of rights to be. Words are
often easier to trace than concepts, however, so I shall begin this
brief history of the concept of rights with a glimpse at the etymology
of the English word 'right.'
I

In English, 'right' is used in a number of ways to mean a number of
things. We may turn to the right, for instance, even when that is not
the right way to turn; the Pythagorean theorem deals with rightangled triangles; governments sometimes shift to the right; straightforward people come right to the point when they seek to right
matters; and we occasionally find that what someone is doing is not
right, morally speaking, even though she has the right to do it. 'Right'
in this last sense - 'right' as a kind of property we can hold, stand on,
or act within; as something we can exercise if we choose, perhaps by
asserting it against others - is our concern here, for this is the sense
that conveys the concept of rights.
Like its cognates in German (recht) and the other Teutonic
languages, 'right' evolved from the Latin word rectus (straight). 2 In
much the same way, its counterparts in French (droit), Italian (diritto),
and Spanish (derecho) are corruptions of the low Latindirectum (Miller
1980 [1903): 48). Rectus, in turn, has been traced through the Greek
orektos (stretched out, upright) to the Sanskrit rju or riju (straight or
upright), which has been connected to raja (shining, radiant, a king)
and the Latin rex (Miller 1980 [1903): 40). The pattern, then, is for
the notion of straightness to be extended from the physical realm to
the moral - from rectus to rectitude, as it were. Something similar
seems to have happened with 'wrong' and 'tort,' which derive
respectively from the Old Norwegian word for curved or bent,
1

2

For an insightful account and criticism of these arguments, and of the Soviet
conception of rights, see Donnelly (1982, esp. pp. 306-13).
The sources for this etymo:ogy of'right' are: Miller (1980 [1903]: 35-48); Salmond
(1907: 463-73); Skeat (1978: 519); and Webster's (1950).

294

RICHARD DAGGER

wrangr, and the Latin word for twisted, tortus (Salmond 1907: 465).
The moral use of these notions is old enough, in fact, for Hesiod to
have called on rulers who "twist the courses of justice aslant" to
"straighten" their decisions (1968: 250-64). 3
But this still leaves us short of an account of how 'right' came to be
used to mean a kind of personal possession, something one can
"have." In this case the answer lies in an extension of the term from
one moral sense to another- from objective to subjective right, to use
the distinction familiar to Continental jurists. By analogy with the
physical sense, the primary moral sense of 'right' was a standard or
measure for conduct. Something was right- morally straight or true
- if it met the standard of rectitude, or rightness. The conjunction of
'right' with a preposition in Old English underscores this point. 4 If
something was done "with right," "by right," or even "in right,"
then it was rightfully done, or done in accordance with the standard
of right conduct. From here, the next step was to recognize that
actions taken "with right" or "by right" are taken as a matter of right.
The transition is from the belief that I may do something because it is
right, in other words, to the belief that I may do something because I
have a right to do it. Once this transition is achieved, 'right' can mean
not only a standard, but also a justifiable claim to act in a certain way
- a claim that becomes a kind of standard itself. Thus the concept of
rights joins the concept of the right.
But when and where and why did this happen? When, that is, did
subjective right emerge as a concept distinct from objective right?
To answer these questions, we shall have to look beyond the English
'right' to its conceptual antecedents.
II

There are two schools of thought, loosely speaking, on the origins of
the concept of rights. One view, perhaps the dominant one, holds
that the concern for rights is characteristic of political and legal
thought only in the modern era, so the concept itself must be either
modern or, at the earliest, late medieval in origin. As John Finnis
puts it (1980: 206-7), there is a "watershed" in the history of 'right'
and its classical antecedent ius, a watershed that occurs somewhere
between Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century and Francisco
Jones (1956: 125) describes Hesiod's views in this way: "It [dike] is straight or right
as opposed to what is wrested, wrung, or wrong ... It is set up against any perverse
twisting ... of something essentially plain, direct, and simple. Personified, this
'straightness' is placed among the gods as the daughter of Zeus and Themis."
' See the examples under 'right,' definition 7, in the Oxford English Dictionary.
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Suarez in the early years of the seventeenth. 5 For Aquinas, Finnis
notes, ius "primarily means 'the fair' or 'the what's fair' "; but for
Suarez (De !egibus, I, ii, 5 ), ius is "a kind of moral power [facu!tas]
which every man has, either over his own property or with respect to
that which is due to him." In De Jure bel!i ac pacts (I, I, iv; 1925: 35 ),
furthermore, Hugo Grotius defines ius much as Suarez did, thus
strengthening the impression that ius was somehow transformed in
the late medieval or early modern period from a standard or law
defining just or right relationships to a faculty or power belonging to
the beneficiary of the relationship - to the one who "has" the
right.
Finnis is fairly cautious here, for some 340 years separate Aquinas
and Suarez. Michel Villey is bolder. Villey (1969) argues forcefully
that le droit subjectif- "une qualite du sujet, une de ses facultes, plus
precisement une franchise, une liberte, une possibilite d'agir" (p.
146) - is the work of William of Ockham. Although he does not
insist that Ockham was the first to use ius in the subjective sense,
Villey does claim that Ockham provided the first clear and complete
definition of the new concept in his Opus nonaginta dierum (c. 1330),
where he deployed it on behalf of his fellow Franciscans in their
controversy with Pope John XXII.
Boldness comes at a price, however, and others have disputed
Villey's claims for Ockham. 6 Richard Tuck maintains, for instance,
that the concept emerged not with Ockham, but in the century
before him as the result of an assimilation of ius and dominium by the
later Glossators, particularly Accursius and his followers. According
to Tuck, "already by the fourteenth century it was possible to argue
that to have a right was to be the lord or dominus of one's relevant
moral world, to possess dominium, that is to say property" (1979: 3;
Tuck's emphasis). In fact, Tuck says (ibid.: 22-3), even Ockham's
opponent, John XXII, employed ius in this sense in his bull Quia vir
reprobus (1329) - the very work that Ockham sought to refute.
Tuck (1979: 13-15) detects intimations of this conception of a
right among the twelfth-century Glossators as well; but because they
thought of rights as passive rather than active claims, he argues, they
could not conceive of rights as a kind of property. As Brian Tierney
sees it (1983: 435), though, Tuck is doubly wrong here: wrong,
firstly, because he mistakes active rights for passive ones; and wrong,
' For a similar view, see Golding (1978: 46-9).
• Perhaps I should say Villey's claim agaiflst Ockham, for Villey seems to deplore the
results of this "moment copernicien de l'histoire de la science du droit ... " (1969:
177).
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secondly, because the active-passive distinction makes no difference
in this context anyhow. This being so, it seems that references to
rights - "either as rights to do something or as rights to enforce
claims against others - are commonly encountered in twelfth
century juridical works." What seems a watershed to Finnis is, for
Tierney, no more than a gentle slope - a slope that begins before
Aquinas, not after him.
Despite their differences, all these scholars, save perhaps Tierney,
believe that the concept of rights is not to be found before the high
or the late middle ages, not even in Roman law. But there is another
school of thought on the matter, one represented most recently by
Alan Gewirth. Gewirth acknowledges that there is little in the way of
direct appeals to the concept of rights or of substantial attempts to
analyze it before the modern period, but this means only that it is
"important to distinguish between having or using a concept and the
clear or explicit recognition and elucidation of it ... Thus persons
might have and use the concept of a right without explicitly having a
single word for it" (1978: 99). With this in mind, Gewirth proceeds
to uncover the concept of rights in feudal thought, Roman law,
Greek philosophy, the Old Testament, and even primitive societies.
The word may not be present, in his view, but the concept surely
is.
This is in many ways a plausible view. It does seem, after all, that
wherever there are rules recognizing and governing the private
ownership of property, as there were as long ago as the Code of
Hammurabi, the concept of rights must also be present. To talk of
"mine" and "thine," that is, is to talk of rights, even if only
implicitly. In other contexts, too, it seems that the Greeks and
Romans, who certainly lacked a specific word for rights, still found
ways to talk about them. 7 The Roman law of persons, with its
attempt to delineate the ways in which a person could move from
one status level to another, seems to reflect a concern for what we
now call legal and political rights, for instance. 8 Thus the Roman
citizen enjoyed not only an opportunity to participate in politics
7

8

See the entries under dikaios in Liddell and Scott (1968), for instance, and those
under ius, especially definitions 10-13, in the Oxford Latin Dictionary. Note
especially Liddell and Scott's reference to Aristotle's Politics (1287b12), o spoudaios
archein dikaios- a phrase Sinclair and Saunders (1981: 227) translate "if ... a sound
man has a right to rule," and Barker (1971: 147) renders "If the good man has a just
title to authority."
According to Nicholas (1962: 60-1), the Roman law of persons was "concerned
with the different categories of 'status' - in the modern sense of a condition in
which a man's rights and duties differ from the normal, that difference not having
been created simply, or at all, by his own consent."

Rights

297

that was denied to others, but a legal standing superior to others as
well- to freedman, to resident alien, and especially to slave, who had
no legal standing at all. 9 Among the citizenry, furthermore, other
distinctions denoted differences in what we regard as rights. Thus
the only person who was legally in his own power (sui iuris) was the
head of the family, the paterfamilias; everyone else was, in the eyes of
the law, alieniiuris, in the power of another (Nicholas 1962: 68). And
even the paterfamilias could suffer capitis deminutio, deterioration of
status, whether it be capitis deminutio minima - loss of family rights;
capitis deminutio media - loss of citizenship and family rights; or capitis
deminutio maxima - loss of liberty, citizenship, and family rights: i.e.,
enslavement (Nicholas 1962: 96).
Which of these positions regarding the origin of the concept of
rights is correct? I doubt that straightforward etymological or
conceptual digging will answer this question once and for all, for the
answer ultimately depends upon what we are willing to count as
"having" a particular concept. If one is willing to look primarily for
the idea or the notion, however it may be expressed, then one can
confidently say that the concept of rights is virtually as old as
civilization itself. The concept may have been embedded in or
scattered among a variety of words - in auctoritas, potestas, dominium,
iurisdictio, proprietas, and libertas as well as ius, to take the Roman
example - but it was there all the same. 10
If one insists that the form of expression is crucial, however, so
that a concept cannot be said to exist unless there is a word or phrase
that distinguishes it from other concepts, then one would have to say
that the concept of rights has its origin in the middle ages. Certainly
the Romans could use auctoritas, potestas, libertas, and other words in
circumstances where we now use 'rights,' but that itself tells against
the claim, on this view, that they possessed the concept of rights.
They had a number of related concepts, that is, but they were not
' "At Rome and with regard to Romans," Wirszubski (1960: 4) says,
full libertas is coterminous with civitas. A Roman's libertas and his civitas both
denote the same thing, only that each does it from a different point of view
and with emphasis on a different aspect: libertas signifies in the first place the
status of an individual as such, whereas civitas denotes primarily the status of
an individual in relation to the community. Only a Roman citizen enjoys all
the rights, personal and political, that constitute libertas.
10

On the relation of these words, and others, to the concept of rights, see Miller
(1980 [1903]: 58-131), who defines a legal right as "a claim, a power, a faculty, a
liberty, an authority, a privilege, a prerogative, a capacity to act or to possess
dominion, empire, power, authority, immunity, status, or some interest put
forward actively if necessary in the form of a case or action at law, and recognized by
the State in accordance with right, law, and justice" (p. 131). On libertas in
particular, see Wirszubski (1960, passim).
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able to distinguish, as we are, the concept of rights from these
others. Even the words with the greatest claim - dikaios for the
Greeks and ius for the Romans - betray the absence of the concept
because in the classical period both words mean right primarily in
the objective sense. Where we say, "I have a right to this book," for
instance, they usually said, "It is right that I have this book" - related
notions, to be sure, but more than merely a difference in the order of
the words. As long as there was no way of distinguishing the
subjective sense of right from the objective, then, the concept of
rights could not truly be said to exist.
This, I think, is the sounder of the two positions on the origin of
the concept. We can say that intimations, anticipations, or glimpses
of the concept are as old as legal and political thinking, certainly, but
we must acknowledge that these are our glimpses; for what seems to
anticipate or intimate the concept of rights can seem so only to those
who already have the concept. Other concepts, narrower conceptsolder members of the same family, so to speak - are easy to find in
ancient thought, but the concept of rights itself is not fully present
until sometime in the later middle ages. After that, emphasis shifts
from the notion of right as a standard for conduct to the notion of
rights as possessions, a kind of personal property. By the seventeenth
century, Grotius could begin De Jure belli ac pact's by distinguishing ius
as "a moral quality of a person, making it possible to have or to do
something lawfully" (I, I, iv) from ius "as nothing else than what is
just" (I, I, iii; 1925: 34-5 ). And by the middle of that century, Hobbes
could, and characteristically did, go even further (Leviathan, chapter
14):
For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound ius, and lex,
right and law: yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT,
consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear: whereas LAW determineth,
and bindeth to one of them: so that law, and right, differ as much, as
obligation, and liberty; which in one and the same matter are
inconsistent.

III
Here, with Hobbes, we have the subjective sense of right distinguished
so sharply from the objective that they are actually opposed to one
another. We also have the concept of rights at the center of political
theory for the first time, not only with Grotius and Hobbes, but with
Suarez, Spinoza, and, at the end of the century, Locke. It is,
moreover, natural rights that play so prominent a part in the political
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thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It almost had
to be.
If the concept of rights did not emerge fully fledged in the classical
period or the early middle ages, it is probably because concepts
rooted in status considerations of one sort or another informed
thought in those periods. To say then that one was a citizen or a lord
was to say, in our terms, that one held certain rights (and was subject
to certain obligations) by virtue of one's position or role in society.
But because the status concepts were fully effective - because they
did the work the concept of rights now does - they precluded any
appeal to rights as such. To say, in these circumstances, "I am a
citizen, therefore I have rights," would have been as pointless as it
now is to say, "I am a carpenter, therefore I have tools."
For the concept of rights to appear and gain purchase, the status
concepts had to lose their grip; and in order for this to happen, the
idea that human beings are fundamentally alike had to displace the
belief that differences in nationality, culture, or rank were rooted in
natural differences between people. This idea of human equality is
an old one - one historian traces it to "the Hebrew account which
describes Adam, whose name means 'humanity,' as being created in
the 'image of God'" (Pagels 1979: 4) - and there were occasional
breakthroughs, such as the "startling" change from "Aristotle's view
of the natural inequality of human nature" to the "theory of the
natural equality of human nature" in Cicero and Seneca (Carlyle and
Carlyle 1950: 8). The idea also found powerful expression in a
cosmopolitan philosophy, Stoicism, and a religion, Christianity,
that emphasized both the individual and the universal. Yet the idea
of natural equality played relatively little part in social and political
thought until the later middle ages, perhaps because neither
Stoicism nor Christianity invested life on earth with much
significance. 11 When it did come into prominence, however, the
concept of rights came with it.
What happened, briefly, is that the growing conviction of the
11

According to Lewis (1974, vol. I: 196), "These two sets of ideas, the Christian and
the Stoic, were to become the chief bases of that sense of human dignity in which
every individualistic trend in Western political thought is finally rooted." But she
also observes that
ecclesiastical thought also conveyed ideas which may seem to us incompatible
with its profound ideas of the equality and freedom of human sol) ls. The early
church had made peace with Roman absolutism and with the great
inequalities and injustices of Roman society; it was prepared to accept the
stratification of the feudal age and the irresponsibility of medieval kings. For
Christ's kingdom was not of this world.
Ibid.
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natural equality of mankind undermined the stratification of society
and the status concepts that helped to justify it. Various forms of
status were subordinated, at least in theory, to only one, humanity,
and in this shift from the particular to the universal the erosion of
status concepts gradually made room for the concept of rights. 12
Indeed, once all supposedly superficial differences were stripped
away, as they were in Leviathan, it was easy - natural, as it were - to
move from the notion that all men are naturally equal to the notion
that all men have natural rights. As rank and hierarchy fade from the
objective order, the objective order itself becomes subjective, at
least to the point where the equality ordained by the perceived order
of things bestows rights upon everyone. It then seems more
straightforward to say "I have a right to this" than "it is right that I
have this."
This is how Locke can draw natural rights out of natural law. For
we are by nature free and equal, as he says in the Second Treatise,
"there being nothing more evident, than that Creatures of the same
species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of
Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one
amongst another without Subordination or Subjection" (1965, vol.
II, § 4: 309). We are free and equal, furthermore, because God,
whose property we are, has made us so, and "there cannot be
supposed any such Subordination among us, that may Authorize us to
destroy one another, as if we were made for one anothers uses, as the
inferior ranks of Crea tu res are for ours" (vol. II, § 5: 311; Locke's
emphasis). In order, therefore, "that all men may be restrained from
invading others Rights ... and the Law of Nature be observed, ...
the Execution of the Law of Nature is in that State [of nature], put into
every Mans hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the
transgressors of that Law to such a Degree, as may hinder its
Violation" (vol. II, § 7: 312; Locke's emphasis).
Reasoning of this sort was neither original with Locke nor
confined to works of high abstraction. As Alasdair Macintyre points
out (1973: 153, 158), a Leveller polemicist, Richard Overton,
advanced a similar argument in 1646 in An Arrow Against All Tyrants.
Overton's words, indeed, speak even more plainly than Locke's to
" According to Ritchie (1952: 6), the Protestant Reformation was the leading factor
in this shift: "The theory of natural rights is simply the logical outgrowth of the
Protestant revolt against the authority of tradition, the logical outgrowth of the
Protestant appeal to private judgment, i.e., to the reason and conscience of the
individual." Others, of course, would award the praise or blame to social and
economic factors.
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the relationship between rights and the "principles of nature"
(Aylmer 1975: 68-9):
To every Individual! in nature, is given an individuall property by
nature, not to be invaded or usurped by any: for every one as he is
himselfe, so he hath a self propriety, else could he not be himselfe, and
on this no second may presume to deprive any of, without manifest
violation and affront to the very principles of nature, and of the Rules
of equity and justice between man and man: mine and thine cannot be,
except this be: No man hath power over my rights and liberties, and I
over no mans ... For by naturall birth, all men are equally and alike
borne to like propriety, liberty and freedome, and as we are delivered of
God by the hand of nature into this world, every one with a naturall,
innate freedome and propriety ... even so are we to live, every one
equally and alike to enjoy his birthright and priviledge: even all whereof
God by nature hath made him free.

The product of this way of thinking is the Age of Rights, exemplified
most dramatically in the United States' Declaration of Independence
(1776) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens
(1789). Man, the individual, shorn of status, role, and often cultural
identity, becomes the center of the moral and political world, and
the chief task of government, in the eyes of many in the West, is to
secure his inalienable rights. It was, as Thomas Paine wrote in 1792,
the dawn of a new and glorious era: "Government founded on a moral
theory, on a system of universal peace, on the indefeasible hereditary Rights of
Man, is now revolving from west to east by a stronger impulse than
the government of the sword revolved from east to west. It interests
not particular individuals, but nations in its progress, and promises a
new era to the human race" (1967: 404; Paine's emphasis).

IV
By the beginning of the nineteenth century the concept of rights was
firmly entrenched in Western legal and political thought. Since
then, there have been few attempts to displace, reconceive, or
abandon it, but a number of attempts to redefine the role it plays in
political life and thought- attempts that were themselves under way
as Paine wrote Rights of Man.
Two of the early critics of rights theories, Burke and Bentham,
started from much the same point - condemnation o(the French
revolutionaries' appeal to natural rights. For both, the danger of the
natural rights approach was its tendency to substitute abstract
rhetoric for sensible, practical thinking. "Natural rights is simple
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nonsense," according to Bentham's judgement on the French
Declaration of Rights, and "natural and imprescriptible rights,
rhetorical nonsense, - nonsense upon stilts" (1970: 32; Bentham's
emphasis). Rights are conventional, not natural, on Bentham's view,
and if we enjoy them at all it is only because we are subject to a legal
system; for to have a right is merely to be the beneficiary of a
relationship sanctioned by law. Because there are no rights without
law and government, law and government cannot possibly be
justified by an appeal to rights. Instead, we should look directly to
utility, understood most simply in terms of the "two sovereign
masters" under which nature has placed us: pain and pleasure
(Bentham 1961: 1).
For Burke, the French appeal to natural rights was dangerous not
because it was nonsensical but because it was blind to circumstance
and tradition. There are natural rights, he acknowledges, abstract
rights that do not depend for their existence on government: "but
their abstract perfection is their practical defect" (1979: 150). To his
mind, the French were elevating a fiction, Man, to the status of a god,
and proclaiming a new religion, the Rights of Man, in his name.
What they and their sympathizers in other countries should be
concerned with, Burke argues, is men as they are, in all their variety
and particularity, whether they be French, English, or Chinese,
peasants, merchants, or craftsmen, nobles or commoners, masters
or apprentices. For "I may assume that the awful Author of our
being is the Author of our place in the order of existence, - and that,
having disposed and marshalled us by a divine tactic ... He has in and
by that disposition virtually subjected us to act the part which
belongs to the place assigned us" ("Appeal from the New to the Old
Whigs," 1967: 54). We have rights, then, and they are a kind of
property, but the kind that attaches to whatever station in life we
may happen to occupy. Those who set the individual against othersthose who talk of rights against society and government- understand
neither rights nor the order of things.
This tendency of the natural rights theorists to abstract man from
his social and historical context is a common ground of criticism in
the nineteenth century, one that unites writers as different from
Burke, and each other, as Hegel, Marx, and T.H. Green. For
Marx,
None of these so-called rights of man goes beyond the egoistic man,
beyond man as a member of civil society, as man separated from life in
the community and withdrawn into himself, into his private interest
and his private arbitrary will. These rights are far from conceiving man
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as a species-being. They see, rather, the life of the species itself, society,
as a frame external to individuals, as a limitation of their original
independence.
"On the Jewish Question," 1983: 109

Rather than retreat with Burke toward status concepts and a notion
of an objective order, however, Marx looked forward, late in his life,
to the transcendence of the rights of man in "a higher phase of
communist society," for "only then can the narrow horizon of
bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its
banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his
needs!" ("Critique of the Gotha Programme," 198 3: 541 ). Once that
horizon is crossed, presumably, human potential will flower forth
and the concept of rights, now rendered useless, will wither and
die. 13
For Green, the liberal, the criticism of the asocial and ahistorical
views of the natural rights theorists leads to an attempt at
accommodation. Rights are not valuable in themselves, he says, but
only insofar as they serve to promote the "moral vocation" or
"moral personality" of the individual. As it happens, Green believes
that rights are necessary to the pursuit of this vocation, much as Mill
believes that liberty is necessary to the well-being of the individual,
so rights prove to be very valuable indeed. "There ought to be
rights," in short, "because the moral personality, - the capacity on
the part of an individual for making a common good his own- ought
to be developed; and it is developed through these rights; i.e. through
the recognition by members of a society of powers in each other
contributory to a common good, and the regulation of those powers
through that recognition" (1967: 45; emphasis added).
Green's attempt at accommodation, then, is an attempt to tie the
rights of the individual to the good of the society to which he
belongs. On this view, our rights are not merely rights against others;
they are also rights to the positive aid of others, aid we need in order
to develop our powers so that we may contribute to the common
good. This is a long way, in less than a century, from Paine's notion
of "the indefeasible hereditary Rights of Man," but it was a journey
many made in the nineteenth century. In theory, at least, the
abstract Man of the Age of Rights had become, once again, a social
creature. As D.G. Ritchie (1952: 102) put it in 1894, "The person
with rights and duties is the product of a society, and the rights of the
individual must therefore be judged from the point of view of a
society as a whole, and not the society from the point of view of the
individual."
13

On Marx's views on rights, see Dunn (1979: 38) and Donnelly (1985: 41-43).
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Where do we stand now, one hundred years after Green and Ritchie,
with regard to the concept of rights? It is so widespread and so firmly
rooted in our habits of thought that it is all but impossible to
conceive of doing without it. 14 Yet it is also difficult to conceive of
what we are going to do with it. Almost everyone invokes the
concept, but its place in political thought is every bit as much a
matter of contention as it was in the last century. Nor is there
significant agreement on how rights are to be grounded- in utility?
in fundamental rights? in the necessary requirements of rational
action? in human needs? - or whether they can be grounded at all. In
these respects, we seem still to be stuck in the nineteenth
century.
There are, however, two developments worthy of note in the
twentieth century. First, philosophers and legal scholars have
devoted considerable attention to the analysis of the concept itself,
one result of which is an abundance, perhaps a superabundance, of
often disputed distinctions: active and passive rights, positive and
negative rights, welfare and option rights, special and general rights,
etc. By general consent, the most impressive of these was set out in
1919 in Wesley Hohfeld's Fundamental Legal Conceptions. As a legal
scholar, Hohfeld's concern was that rights and their correlative
concept, duties, were too broadly and indiscriminately construed.
According to his analysis, this masks four distinct and fundamental
relations under law: rights (i.e., rights in the strict sense) and their
correlative, duties; privileges and no-rights; powers and liabilities; and
immunities and disabilities (1964: 36).
From the standpoint of social and political philosophy, the
principal value ofHohfeld's categories seems to lie in the distinction
between rights- also called claims or claim-rights- and privileges- now
better known as liberties or liberty-rights. 15 On Hohfeld's distinction,
claim-rights entail a correlative duty on the part of at least one other
person, but liberty-rights do not. The difference may be brought out
by a pair of familiar examples. If Jones borrows $10 from Smith,
Smith then has a claim-right to the return of the money, and Jones has
a duty to repay her; but if] ones and Smith see a $10 bill in the street
with no one but the two of them in sight, then each has a liberty-right
to the money even though neither has a duty, ceteris paribus, to let the
14

Feinberg's (1980) "thought experiment" is instructive in this regard.
" For helpful discussions of Hohfeld and other developments in the analysis of
rights, see Feinberg (1973, chap. 4) and the introduction to Waldron (1984).
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other have it. By distinguishing rights from liberties in this way,
Hohfeld stresses the relational aspect of rights. Where the rights
theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries tended to
regard a right as a faculty or possession, that is, Hohfeld encourages
us to conceive of a right as a kind of standing, a relationship between
one person, the right-holder, and others. It may not have been his
intention, but in this sense Hohfeld's analysis of rights reinforces the
efforts of the nineteeth-century writers who sought to endow rights
with a social dimension.
Much the same could be said for the second notable development
this century in the concept of rights- the popularity of the notion of
human rights among philosophers, political figures, and common
people throughout much of the world. Human rights is the direct
descendant of natural rights, of course, and not, therefore, an entirely
new notion. But the shift from "natural" to "human" rights
betokens a significant change of emphasis. As the passages quoted
earlier from Locke and Overton suggest, arguments from natural
rights typically proceeded from the idea of self-possession, from a
property in oneself that must be defended against others; with human
rights, however, arguments usually rest on some conception of a
human or (perhaps more precisely) a person as a being with needs
and interests that must be met if he or she is to live a fully human life.
Thus the rights against others of the natural rights theorists tend to
become the claims upon others of the human rights theorists.
This different emphasis is manifest in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948. There,
alongside such familiar proclamations as Article Three - "Everyone
has the right to life, liberty, and security of person" - we find such
novel assertions as the right to marry and found a family, the right to
rest and leisure, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the
right to participate in the cultural life of the community (Melden
1970: 143-9). Whether these really are or ought to be regarded as
rights, human or otherwise, is open to dispute; but the important
point here is that these putative rights are put forward as important
elements or vital ingredients in a fully realized human life. In that
sense, the popularity of the appeal to human rights reveals a
concern, not for what we are, but for what we can and presumably
should be.
This concern is displayed also in the efforts to secure rights for
more specific groups of human beings - women's rights, "gay"
rights, the rights of national or cultural minorities, etc. In each of
these cases, the core argument is that the members of the relevant
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group suffer because they are neither accorded the same respect nor
afforded the same opportunities as other persons. They are
prevented from realizing their capacities, in other words, and denied
the consideration to which human beings are entitled- to be treated
with full respect for their dignity as persons.
Perhaps this is why we live, once again, in an age of rights. No
other concept at present captures so well the idea that every person,
regardless of his or her place in society, is worthy of respect as a
person. Certainly the concept of human dignity, despite the power
ofdigntfas as a status concept inancientRome (Wirszubski 1960: 1213), now lacks the conceptual force of an appeal to rights. With the
field left to rights, it begins to seem, as Joel Feinberg (1980: 151)
puts it, that "respect for persons ... may simply be respect for their
rights, so there cannot be the one without the other; and what is
called 'human dignity' may simply be the recognizable capacity to
assert claims. To respect a person, then, or to think of him as
possessed of human dignity, simply is to think of him as a potential
maker of claims."
Concepts are like human beings in this respect: they flourish when
they have work to do. So long as we continue to think of men and
women as "potential makers of claims," then, the concept of rights
will not lack for employment; and the more work we find for the
concept of rights to do, the more likely we are to think of men and
women as "potential makers of claims" who are worthy of respect as
persons.
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